


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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH BASED ESSAY

CAN THE UNITED STATES MOBILIZE
TO MEET A SUSTAINED WAR IN EUROPE?

BY

COLONEL JOHN E. PAULUS



16 APRIL 82

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACTiii
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.	1
Statement of the Problem.	1
Mobilization Defined.	1
Recent Mobilization Experiences	2
Summary of Recent Mobilization Experiences.	5
II MOBILIZATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.	7
Introduction.	7
Personnel Readiness	9
Equipment Readiness	12
Training Readiness.	14
Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)	15
Summary of Reserve Component Readiness.	16
III STRATEGIC MOBILITY.	19
IV SUSTAINING THE FORCE	23
Training Base Expansion	23
Industrial Base Expansion	24
V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY	31

ABSTRACT

This essay addresses the issue, "Can the United States mobilize to meet a sustained war in Europe?" In addressing this issue, I examined the three major components of mobilization. First the Reserve Components, are they ready? The next aspect I looked at was once we have mobilized the Reserve Components, can we get them over there? The last aspect was once we got the forces over there, can we sustain them? In this last area both the expansion of the training base and the industrial base were examined.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem.

Can the United States mobilize to meet a sustained war in Europe? In this paper, I will attempt to analyze this issue, first by examining the current status of the Reserve Components. Can we mobilize the Reserve Components - are they ready? Once we have mobilized them, do we have enough Strategic Mobility (air and sealoift) to get them to the war? And last, but not least, once we got them there, can we sustain them? Do we have the capability to expand the training base and industrial base to provide them with the necessary personnel and equipment to sustain them? These are the questions I plan to address in this paper, but before I do, first let me define mobilization.

Mobilization.

Mobilization is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing the national resources. It is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and material for active military service, federalization of the Reserve Components, extension of terms of service and other actions necessary to convert to a wartime posture.¹

Before I go on, let me cover briefly our history of mobilization over the last 40 years. How well have we done in the past?

Recent Mobilization Experiences.

During the past 45 years, the United States has on five occasions faced national emergencies of such magnitude as to require the mobilization of reserve forces. The five occasions were:

World War II

Korea

Berlin Blockade

Cuban Crisis

Vietnam

A brief summary of each one of the five mobilizations follows.

World War II. In September 1939, when war broke out in Europe, the strength of the Regular Army was approximately 187,000 men. Some 50,000 officers and enlisted men were dispersed throughout our overseas possessions. The remainder of the forces within the Continental United States were scattered throughout 130 different Army posts. The force structure was basically nine infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions and miscellaneous small separate units. All of these units were understrength.

The strength of the National Guard in September 1939, was approximately 200,000 men with a designated force structure of 18 divisions plus basic units to make up an additional four cavalry divisions and mobilization support units. These units were seriously understrength. Their training at that time consisted of 48 nightly drills, plus two weeks of annual field duty each year. This proved to be inadequate, as the National Guard required extensive training before being committed to

combat.²

The force structure of the USAR was 27 divisions, but the fact remains that these units existed only on paper. The strength of the USAR was 119,000 men broken down into 116,000 officers mostly from the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program, and 3,000 enlisted men. Training for these reserve forces consisted largely of correspondence courses and two weeks active duty a year.³

This background set the stage for the critical period of mobilization which occurred 15 months prior to the United States involvement in World War II. Approximately half of the National Guard divisions were mobilized in three months, starting in September 1940, with all divisions being called to active duty within seven months.

In both the National Guard and the USAR, the training level of officers and NCOs were found to be very low in addition to the severe personnel and equipment shortfalls. In many instances, officers and NCOs required additional training in order to become qualified to train the troops assigned to their units. This deficiency was a serious detriment and delayed the units reaching combat ready status.⁴

So as we can see, the Reserve Components weren't quite ready for World War II, but fortunately we had advanced warning and mobilized early.

Korean War. The Korean mobilization of reserve forces was significantly different than that of World War II. It was a partial mobilization spread over a considerable time span. Korea was a limited war and existing mobilization plans were based on a World War II situation. There were no plans for a limited mobilization.⁵

At the start of the Korean War the force structure of the NG was 27 divisions, 20 regimental combat teams and supporting units. The NG was

at 93 percent strength. The USAR consisted of both units and filler personnel. The USAR strength was about 75 percent of authorized.⁶

The mobilizations of both the NG and USAR units again found that these units were not ready for deployment because of deficient unit training. Individuals of the Ready Reserve forces, many of whom were veterans of World War II, made significant contributions by providing a source of replacement personnel. However, as in World War II, the fact remained that the production of combat units from the RC's was not significantly faster than that prescribed for organization of units from active Army cadre and fillers.⁷

Berlin Crisis. The Berlin Crisis was a unique mobilization situation. President Kennedy, as authorized by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, saw fit to mobilize a part of the reserve forces although the United States was not involved in hostilities. Prior to the call to active duty the NG was very near 100 percent strength with a force of 27 divisions plus numerous separate units. The USAR units numbered ten infantry divisions, 13 training divisions, and other support units.

Compared to past mobilizations the call to active duty for Berlin was rather small. Only two of the NG divisions and a few smaller units were activated. The USAR furnished a total of 444 company size units needed to round out the expanding active army forces.⁸ Despite the small number of forces mobilized it was still apparent that the Reserve Components as it existed had difficulty producing combat ready units. Many of the units found it necessary to suspend training until such time as qualified filler personnel were available. As in World War II and Korea it was evident that there were still problems in the RC system.⁹

Vietnam War. At the start of US involvement in the Vietnam War, a decision was made by the President of the United States not to have a general mobilization of the reserve forces for the buildup in Vietnam. One of the reasons for this decision was reflected in the statement by General Wheeler. He stated that:

The reserves could not be moved to combat in 90 days as had been planned, but would require four months. A unit formed using draftee fillers could be made ready within the same period of time.¹⁰

Later, some three years after the US had become involved in Vietnam with ground forces, a small number of the reserve forces, something over one percent, were called to active duty. Both NG and USAR units were called. Research indicates that once again many of the personnel and training problems noted in past mobilizations were encountered resulting in excessive time being required for units to become combat ready.¹¹

Summary of Recent Mobilization Experiences

This has been a brief look at our nation's past mobilization experiences over the last 40 years. It is evident that the reserve system was found to have significant deficiencies in World War II and was only moderately successful in subsequent crises. There are many reasons cited for this ineffectiveness, yet in each instance, deficiencies in manpower, equipment, and training stands out. With increasing emphasis being placed upon the reserves under the Total Force concept, how well off are our reserve components today? The next chapter will address this issue.

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CHAPTER II

MOBILIZATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

ETHIOPIAN MOBILIZATION ORDER AGAINST MUSSOLIN'S FORCES (1935)

Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged.

Haille Selassie

Introduction.

Since that mobilization order was published and the last time we mobilized, times have become more complex. With increased emphasis on the Reserve Components and decreased deployment times, will the reserves be ready when called upon?

As the size of the active component diminished following Vietnam, that portion of the Total Army mission in the Reserve Components has increased. These new missions require that many Reserve Component units be capable of early activation and deployment in the event of mobilization.

This nation raises and maintains military forces for two primary purposes: to deter others from employing military force against us and to conduct military operations if deterrence should fail. The ability to be ready to fight or conduct military operations successfully is by

far the more important of the two functions. If our military forces are not prepared to fight, then few of our adversaries will be deterred from committing hostile acts against us or our interests. As we enter what many observers call the dangerous decade of the 1980's, the international situation is in profound disarray and the possibility that this nation will have to employ military force grows ever more likely as we are confronted by more and more situations adverse to our interests.¹

Today, there is understandable and growing concern about the capability or readiness of our forces to conduct military operations. Almost daily, our newspapers and newscasts are filled with stories about the inability of ships to get under way, aircraft to get off the ground, and tanks to move. Recently, the major networks have run several specials about the current lack of preparedness of our armed forces. The television journalists, through interviews with enlisted men and officers, convey the impression that our military forces cannot adequately perform their primary functions. The inability to place six helicopters into Tehran seemed to confirm this impression. Instead of having a well-oiled military machine befitting a superpower, we appear too often to have "the gang that can't shoot straight."²

Not everyone agrees that our military forces are as unprepared as this might indicate. Many people talk confidently about the success of the all-volunteer force, the readiness of U.S. forces to secure access to vital resources, and the capability of our forces to meet the Soviet threat. The former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown in a speech before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on July 18, 1980 stated, "That those who suggest that U.S. forces are unprepared are playing fast and loose with the truth."³

In today's environment, it is very possible that the outcome of a major conflict, such as an attack against NATO, may be determined in a short time and depend on the resources in place plus the rapid mobilization and deployment of our Reserve Components. For these forces a fully combat ready status is a must because the luxury of mobilizing and deploying additional forces over an extended period may no longer be possible. If and when additional forces are needed, the current emphasis is on rapid reinforcement with highly ready forces.

Although the citizen-soldier concept is as old as the nation, the total force policy and the all volunteer force have placed even greater reliance on the National Guard and Reserve than ever before. Half of the nation's combat power and two-thirds of its support capability are maintained in the Reserve Components. Simply stated, deterring our potential adversaries depends significantly on maintaining both the strength of these forces and providing a correct perception of this strength.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine the three major components of Reserve Component Readiness - Personnel, Equipment, and Training Readiness and see just how ready the Reserve Component units are. In conclusion of this chapter, we will look at one final aspect of the Reserve Components, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

Personnel Readiness.

Since the beginning of the All Volunteer Force, the United States has become more dependent on its Reserve Forces to provide a major part of our national defense. Both combat and support units in the Selected Reserve are scheduled for deployment in the early phases of a major war in Europe. However, the Reserve Forces have serious manpower problems

that would severely limit their ability to perform if needed in wartime. A 1979 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report⁴ identified the following problems in Reserve Component Personnel Readiness:

Personnel Shortages. Serious manpower shortages limit the Reserve Components' ability to perform their wartime missions. Overall, the Reserve Forces have about 87 percent of the people they need in peacetime and about 80 percent of the people they would need in wartime.



Unqualified Personnel. Aggravating the manpower shortages is the fact that many people already in the Reserve Forces are not qualified for their assigned jobs. Records indicate that approximately 25 percent of those personnel assigned are not fully qualified.

Personnel Turnover. Further complications are caused when more than the desired number of experienced people are lost and, in turn, are replaced by people who may be new to the military or to the jobs they are doing in the Reserves. From June 1977 to June 1978, losses of these people were approximately 23 percent.

Concern was echoed by various other Department of Defense and military service representatives who testified before Congress. For example, the Chief of Army Reserve told the House Appropriations Committee:

Since the end of the draft in 1972, the strength of the Army Reserve has been allowed to decline to a very low level. This strength shortfall is the primary contributor to our present force readiness level that is less than we can attain with adequate manning, it is obviously impossible for units to achieve their true potential of training and readiness.⁵

Since that report was prepared, the Department of Defense and Army have recognized the problem and developed some initiatives (i.e.; enlistment and reenlistment bonuses) to reverse that downward trend. The chart shown below reflects that reversal.



Source: Defense Management Journal, Third Quarter 1981, p. 26.

Following this recent strength reversal, the two Reserve Component Chiefs made a more optimistic statement on the personnel side of the readiness picture.

We can say with pride that the commitment of the ARNG to reaching its authorized strength has never been stronger. With continued support from Congress and the Nation, authorized strength will be reached in Fiscal Year 1987 when the ARNG reaches 432,000. For fiscal year 1981, ARNG strength is projected to reach above 387,000.⁶

Chief, National Guard Bureau

The Chief of the Army Reserve made the following statement on March 4, 1982 before the House of Representatives Subcommittee of Readiness:⁷

Commencing in FY 1979, the Army Reserve troop program units began a recovery from a precipitous strength decline in earlier years. Strength gains during Fiscal Years 1979, 1980, and 1981, were approximately 4,200, 12,600, and 17,500 respectively. This significant turnaround can in large part be attributed to improved retention in units as well as meeting recruiting objectives. For FY 1982 and FY 1983, increases of 14,900 and 14,680 are respectively projected, bringing the paid drill strength at the end of the year to 251,000.

Chief, Army Reserve

Edward J. Philbin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, recently told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that new pay incentives and better full-time support of the Reserve Components has vastly improved recruiting and retention in the Army Reserve and National Guard, and that he projects that within five years the Reserve Components should be up to their wartime strength authorizations.⁸

So as you can see, there has been significant improvement in the personnel area, with a projected get well date in the mid 1980s. Next, let's look at the equipment side of the readiness picture.

Equipment Readiness.

The equipment side of the readiness picture has never been very good. Equipping the Reserves has long been a matter of concern in the Department of Defense. In 1947, for example, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, established a committee known as the Gray Board to undertake a realistic look at what Reserve units would in fact be able to do at the outbreak of a war.

The Gray Board discovered that during World War II it took nearly three years after mobilization before we were able to equip the Reserves for offensive operations, although troops to use the equipment were available at an earlier date. Not unexpectedly, the Gray Board concluded that initial issues of necessary equipment should be expedited.

Shortly thereafter, the Department of Defense set a "get well" date for the National Guard and Reserve units - a date when the units would have sufficient combat serviceable equipment to "go to war." Unfortunately, that "get well" date and subsequent "get well" dates were generally in the out-years of the budget. Furthermore, whenever

Department of Defense seemed to make progress in improving the Reserve forces' equipment posture, there seemed to be a setback, often because of an unprogrammed intervening higher priority. For over three decades, there have been "ailing" Guard and Reserve units, as equipment "get well" dates have been continuously moved forward.⁹

Five years ago it was popular to say that the Reserve forces must be prepared for a "come as you are" war. The implied meaning in this phrase was that Reserve units, even if undermanned and under equipped, would be promptly mobilized and deployed in a future crisis. In other words, a unit could be committed to battle with less than 100 percent of its personnel and equipment, and as a result, its staying power in combat could be severely limited.¹⁰ At best, it would be risky to consider deploying a unit that did not meet at least minimal combat readiness; at worst, it would certainly place an additional burden on the theater commander receiving the unready unit.

The "come as you are" war philosophy was never intended to justify equipment shortages in the Reserve forces, rather it was meant to convey the importance of restoring Reserve units to a high state of peacetime readiness.¹¹

Back in the era when force planners envisioned several months elapsing before deploying Reserve Component units, Reserve units did not need their full allotment of equipment. All they needed was sufficient equipment to train on. However, with today's Reserve forces expected to deploy in days, not months. This means that early deploying units must have on-hand a complete set of wartime equipment in order to avoid having to draw it upon mobilization.

It is estimated that today, the Reserve Components have only about half of their wartime requirement and that it would take approximately

five billion dollars to make up this shortfall.¹²

As Major General Emmett H. Walker Jr., Director, Army National Guard stated, "Equipment continues to be a major concern, specifically, the modernization of outdated equipment and the acquisition of enough equipment to support our wartime requirements."¹³

Major General Walker's concern is also shared by the Chief of the Army Reserve. In a recent article by the Chief of the Army Reserve, Major General Berkman, stated:¹⁴

Adequate equipment for units of the Army Reserve is an essential factor in the readiness equation There must be assurances that all required equipment will be available to Army Reserve units upon mobilization in quantities and at locations necessary to meet deployment schedules and to perform their wartime missions Although recent progress has been significant, more progress and resources are required if the Army Reserve is to meet the mobilization demands of the 1980s.

Training Readiness.

Training Readiness is very closely tied to Personnel and Equipment Readiness. Primarily because of the high personnel turnover rate and shortages of modern equipment, Reserve Component training readiness is also slightly below par.

In a somewhat dated, but still relevant letter to the Commander of Forces Command, the Commander of Sixth Army stated:¹⁵

This year training was much improved, but continues to be hampered by low strength and personnel turbulence. I am still convinced that units within this Army area will be training at company and lower levels until such time as we can stem the exodus of qualified people for the Reserve Components.

Obsolete and outdated equipment also poses a problem in Training Readiness. In a Joint Posture statement by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, before a Joint Committee of Congress, they made the following statement on the impact of obsolete

equipment on training readiness:

Approximately two-thirds of our maintenance and support units are in the Guard and Reserve, and even though the quality of their maintenance personnel is high, they need to train with the equipment they would maintain in war. That equipment is generally not available. Furthermore, skills required to repair sophisticated equipment, like tank turrets, fire control devices, and artillery pieces, must be learned in a structured training environment. Guard and Reserve units often lack an adequate training environment. Also, training devices and training time on the equipment available are generally not adequate, especially for mechanics and other support personnel. As modernization efforts accelerate, these equipment related problems will grow significantly.¹⁶

Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).

The other major element of the Ready Reserve is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The purpose of the IRR is to provide immediately upon mobilization trained individuals to fill both Active and Reserve Component units to wartime levels and to provide replacements for battlefield casualties until such time as output from the Selective Service System and training base can provide these fillers and replacements.

The IRR is made up of individuals who have completed their active duty tour but still have time remaining on their six year military obligation. Historically, the size of the IRR has been a function of the size of the active force, since individuals released from active service must remain in the IRR until the end of their six year military obligation. As large numbers of men were drafted during the Vietnam years, the IRR reached a maximum strength of 1.5 million.¹⁷ Since this sum exceeded any foreseeable mobilization requirement, serious management attention was not focused on the IRR until the end of the draft and corresponding decrease in the size of the IRR.

Currently the strength of the IRR is approximately 233,000. Based upon project shortfall in current Active and Reserve Component units

and projected replacements for battlefield casualties, it is estimated that the IRR is short approximately 250,000 individuals.¹⁸

Summary of Reserve Component Readiness.

As we can see from the preceeding, the strength of the Reserve Components is improving and by the mid-1980s the Reserve Components should be up to their authorized strength levels, however, the equipment side of the picture is not as bright with the Reserve Components only having approximately 50% of their wartime requirements. The Individual Ready Reserve is only at about half of their wartime requirement, a serious shortfall.

CHAPTER II

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16. Joint Posture Statement by the Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army, General E. C. Meyer before Joint Committees of the Second Session of the 97th Congress, FY 1983.

17. Major General W. Stanford Smith, "Reserve Readiness in a Changing Environment," Defense Management Journal, Third Quarter 1981, p. 22.

18. Major General William R. Berkman, p. 130.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC MOBILITY

A combat force cannot perform its mission if it is not projected into the objective area in time to influence events.¹

John O. Marsh
Secretary of the Army

Once we have mobilized the forces, will we be able to deploy them? While our ground forces have numerical shortfalls, none is in as bad a shape as our mobility forces. The Air Force has 280 C-141 and 76 C-5 aircraft to carry men and material from the United States to the area of operations. These 356 aircraft must be capable of moving five army divisions and nine tactical fighter squadrons to Europe within ten days after mobilization. In addition, minimum essential support to both our ground and air forces must be provided by these aircraft until sealift can deliver more substantial support. This simply cannot be done by 356 planes in less than thirty days.² While the use of the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) assets, which consist of 34 wide-bodied cargo planes and 187 narrow-bodied passenger aircraft, would reduce the time needed for mobilization by about five days the planning objective of ten days or less still could not be achieved. In addition, it is highly questionable if DOD could get access to all the planes in the CRAF immediately.³

For example, our airlift cannot even begin to handle the so-called minor contingency or half-war scenario. It would take the Military Airlift Command (MAC), using all its assets and augmented by CRAF, at least fifteen days to move the army's lightest divisions, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airmobile into the Persian Gulf. A mechanized brigade would take more than twenty-two days. A regular mechanized division with all their equipment could not be lifted to the gulf region in less than a month. Placing a significant force of about 200,000 men into the area would take a full six months.⁴

Sealift is in even poorer shape than airlift. DOD exercises demonstrate that we need 3,000 cargo ships to reinforce Europe properly. The Navy has but thirty-seven vessels in its own sealift force, 75 percent less than a decade ago. The National Defense Reserve Fleet numbers but 160 ships. The U.S. Merchant Marine could not help very much. Over the past two decades the number of ships in our Merchant Marine has been cut in half. The United States, with 560 ships in its entire merchant fleet, now ranks tenth among the world's merchant fleets, and our portion of the world's gross tonnage is less than 5 percent. Moreover, our merchant fleet is old; more than one-third of our ships are more than twenty-five years of age.⁵

The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff in a joint statement before Congress had this to say about Strategic Mobility:⁶

U.S. strategic mobility forces are currently unable to meet NATO reinforcement objectives or to project credible U.S. forces to areas where our national interests are threatened. Without additional outside airlift and responsive fast sealift, our ability to respond to global contingencies is dependent upon the readiness of our forward-deployed units, upon the prepositioning of unit equipment and war material, and upon timely political decisions.

Our prepositioned equipment and war reserve stocks are inadequate for many contingencies, and no one can guarantee that

political decisions will be timely, especially when some of the most crucial ones might be made by our adversaries and without our knowledge. Mobility forces, both air and sea, must therefore be increased to improve our power projection capability and to preserve the flexibility needed to respond to any threat to our vital national interests.

So as you can see, our strategic mobility leaves much to be desired.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

1. Joint Posture Statement by the Secretary of the Army, John J. Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army, General E. C. Meyer, before Joint Committees of the First Session of the 97th Congress, FY 1982, p. 14.

2. Melvin R. Laird and Lawrence J. Korb, The Problem of Military Readiness, p. 6.

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CHAPTER IV

SUSTAINING THE FORCE

Once we have mobilized the force, and assuming that we can deploy them can we sustain the force?

In order to sustain the force, we must be able to provide them with personnel replacements and equipment. This requires expanding both the training and industrial base. This chapter will look into those two aspects.

Training Base Expansion.

The early demand for trained personnel will cause demands for training base for expansion. The Army must be able to train sufficient personnel to meet the manpower requirements of the forces as they are committed on the battlefield.

In order to meet our need for trained manpower in the event of a major war, we must be able to accept and train new soldiers as rapidly as possible after mobilization. In order to accomplish this, the Army receives twelve USAR Training Divisions to assist in expanding the training base. Unfortunately, these units lack the necessary equipment to fully expand the training base. We have enough trainers and training units to accept 133,000 recruits during the first month following mobilization, but due to equipment shortages, we can accept only 83,000. In the second month, equipment shortages limit our capability to 57,000 and

during the third month to 42,000. All totaled, the Army has the capacity in the first 90 days to handle about 334,000, but due to ammunition and equipment constraints can only handle about 182,000.¹

In addition to severe shortages in major items of training equipment, there are shortages in individual clothing and equipment. While contingency plans for the conduct of recruit training with equipment substitutions have been developed, additional resources are needed to train the numbers of soldiers needed under reasonable effective conditions.²

Here again, equipment seems to be our main constraint in expanding the training base. As former Commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Donn A. Starry said in his article in the October 1981 Army Magazine.³

When establishing priorities, the important role of the training base in sustaining committed forces must be acknowledged. If a steady flow of combat-ready replacements is to be provided the deployed force, sufficient equipment must be provided to the training base.

Projected equipment shortfalls in both our Reserve Component units and our training base establishment, leads us to the next section. Can the industrial base be expanded in time to provide us the necessary equipment?

Industrial Base Expansion.

If a major conflict occurs, where will the Army get its beans, bullets and blankets? A large percentage of what it takes to fight a war would come from the nation's industrial base, thousands of contractors and subcontractors. Contrary to what some think, the Department of Defense doesn't hold these companies as a captive source. They are in private hands. In fact, DOD owns only 83 facilities for turning out war

material.⁵

There is little hope that these private companies could switch from commercial to military production very rapidly. It has been estimated that it would take anywhere from 18 to 36 months to increase production enough to make a difference on the battlefield.⁶

The industrial base is weak, for instance, today there is only one producer of precision ball bearings for military airframes and a single manufacturer of castings for tank turrets and hulls.⁷ Industries that might have invested in military business have chosen to develop their technologies and build their plants for other purposes. This shift away from government contracts is due in part to the fact that defense contracts are awarded on a year-by-year basis. This makes many private businesses wary of long-term military commitments.

Minerals critical in making defense goods, including titanium, manganese, cobalt and chromium are in short supply. In addition, there is a shortage of skilled labor. It is estimated that America may lose 250,000 machinists within the next five years.⁸

Fortunately, the government is waking up. Congress is looking at multi-year contracts, and many of the 31 major hardware acquisition policy changes recommended by the Department of Defense are being implemented. But the industrial base will remain weak for some time.

General Donald R. Keith, the Commander of the Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) said it best in his article in October 1981, in Army Magazine,⁹ "The United States can be neither a world leader nor a first-rate military power with a second-rate industrial base."

CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES

1. Harry M. Walters, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, "The Army is on Track but has a Way to Go," The Officer, December 1981, p. 18.
2. Joint Posture Statement by Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General E. C. Meyer, before Joint Committees of the Second Session of the 97th Congress, FY 1983.
3. General Donn A. Starry, "Mobilization's Challenge to Army's Training Base," Army Magazine, October 1981, p. 42.
4. General Henry A. Miley, "Will U.S. Factories Lose the Fight?" Army Reserve Magazine, Winter 1982, p. 11.
5. Ibid., p. 11.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Peter J. Banstein, "U.S. Defense Industrial Base is Crumbling," Patriot News, September 14, 1981, p. 1.
8. General Miley, p. 11.
9. General Donald R. Keith, "Strong Industrial Base Vital to Readiness," Army Magazine, October 1981, p. 193.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In answer to the original question, "Can the United States mobilize to meet a sustained war in Europe?", the short answer would be not very well. It would be safe to conclude that there are some problems in the Reserve Components, especially on the equipment side. I think the Chiefs of the two Reserve Components said it well in the following statements:

The Army National Guard's strength is steadily rising and there is no shortage of spirit, expertise and training opportunities required for early deployment missions, but lack of equipment still inhibits readiness.¹

Major General Emmett H. Walker Jr.
Director, Army National Guard

With a new front-line readiness mission and a significant part of the total Army's general support forces, the Army Reserve has made solid gains in manpower and training, but is still short much equipment it would need in war.²

Major General William R. Berkman
Chief, Army Reserve

With the Reserve Components currently having only about 50 percent of their wartime equipment authorizations on hand,³ I think it will be quite awhile before the Reserve Components "get well" in this area. As this article pointed out, these "get well" dates are always projected way out into the future and we never seem to get there. We need to reverse this trend.

Primarily because of the equipment shortfall, there is a corresponding degradation in the training readiness. The Reserve simply does not have the latest equipment available to train on, equipment that they would be required to maintain upon mobilization.

The only other serious problem in the Reserve Components appears in the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR). With a projected shortfall of about 250,000 it appears unlikely that the IRR will be able to meet our mobilization requirements.⁴ There are several initiatives being considered in this area that will hopefully help in this area (ie: Extension of term of service, direct enlistment in the IRR, and reenlistment bonuses). Unfortunately, all of these will take time to build the IRR up to required levels.

Once we have mobilized the Reserve Components, it appears that we will not be able to get them over there in the time frame required, especially if we need to deploy to some other area simultaneously. A recent DOD initiative to procure 85 additional C-5A's and KC-10's offers some hope in this area. It appears that by the mid 1980's we will be well in this area.⁵

Of all the areas examined, the industrial base appears to be in the worst shape. I think improvement in this area can only come through improving the DOD procurement policies and by starting to procure the equipment we are short in the Reserve Components and in the war reserve stocks. By doing this, we will significantly reduce our demand on the industrial base in the early days of mobilization, and will also give us a larger base to start from.

So in summary, I think we need to improve the equipment posture of our Reserve Components, and in doing so we will improve our industrial

base. It doesn't seem to make much sense to have our Reserve Component units manned at approximately 85 - 90 percent of their wartime strength and to have the equipment strength at 50 percent.

When it takes approximately 13 weeks after mobilization to train a recruit into a deployable trooper, and 18 to 36 months to procure the necessary equipment to deploy the unit, I think we need to increase our equipment fill to equal to or greater than our personnel fill.

Hopefully we will learn from history. As DA Pamphlet 20-212, "The History of Military Mobilization" states:

It can still be said that the United States has never adequately planned for a mobilization before it occurred The most important lesson to be learned is that the United States must do better the next time it mobilizes.⁶

I hope so.

CHAPTER V

ENDNOTES

1. Major General Emmett H. Walker, Jr., "Manpower Climbs Equipment Lags in the Army National Guard," Army Magazine, October 1981, p. 112.
2. Major General William R. Berkman, "The Reserves and Mobilization Readiness," Army Magazine, October 1981, p. 126.
3. Captain P. E. Smith, "Challenge of the Eighties: Equipping the Guard and Reserve," Defense Management Journal, Third Quarter, 1981 p. 49.
4. Major General William R. Berkman, p. 130.
5. George C. Wilson, "C-5A Plane Flying Into More Turbulence," Washington Post, January 21, 1982, p. 10.
6. LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army 1775-1945, p. 695-697.

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